### NC

Merriam Webster[[1]](#footnote-1) defines “to negate” as “to deny the existence or truth of” so we should adopt a truth testing model of the resolution—that’s key to common usage—this is the first definition that comes up when you google the word which maximizes the chance that people will know to abide by this interp which is key to fairness and education because unpredictable paradigms moot our ability to engage in different positions. This also means you presume neg since statements are more often false then true-if you threw together a bunch of words the chances the statement would be true are small. Substantive reasons to presume precede theoretical ones since there is still a degree of offense left in the round.

Denying assumptions proves a statement false according to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.

Ludlow Peter Ludlow (Prof of phil at northwestern). “Descriptions.” SEP. 26 July 2007. http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/archives/fall2008/entries/descriptions/

Since Parmenides, **philosophers have worried about how one can use a nondenoting expression in a meaningful utterance**. If I use a name like ‘Pegasus’ or a description like ‘the present King of France’ don't these expressions have to refer to something in order for my utterance of the sentence to be meaningful? Clearly I can use these expressions in a meaningful way; consider sentences like ‘The present King of France does not exist’, ‘Pegasus does not exist’, ‘Smith believes that The present King of France is bald’ etc. The space of possible answers is fairly constrained here. For example, one can argue (ala Meinong (1904), Parsons (1980) and Zalta (1983, 1988)) that these expressions really do refer (albeit to nonexistent objects), one can argue that one is referring to a concept of some sort (for example the concept of Pegasus), or one can claim that one really isn't expressing a complete proposition in these cases, but that the sentence itself is nonetheless meaningful (Strawson 1950). **Russell saw a** different **solution**—one in which it was possible to express a proposition with definitive truth conditions, but one **without** the (in his view) **unsavory metaphysical commitments of nonexistent objects** or concepts. **The idea is very simple. Consider** a negative existential sentence like (6). (6) **The Present King of France does not exist** Because definite descriptions are devices of quantification on Russell's view they can enter into scope relations with other operators—in this case, for example, negation. Accordingly, there is a kind of ambiguity in (1), between the following two logical forms. (6a) not ([the x: x is the present King of France] exists(x)) (6b) [the x: x is the present King of France] not (exists(x)) **If one wants to avoid the ontological entanglements of nonexistent objects, then one is free to say that** (6b)**[it] is false** (since it involves quantifying over things that don't exist) but that (6a) is true (since it is not the case that there is a present King of France). **What is negated in (6a) is not a claim about some particular individual, but rather a general claim about the world—in effect a claim that the world contains exactly one individual that is presently the King of France and that whoever is presently the King of France exists.** The same holds when I use a definite description in a propositional attitude report. If I say ‘Smith believes that the present King of France is bald’ I am claiming that Smith believes a general proposition—not a proposition about some particular individual, but rather a proposition to the effect that someone or other satisfies the property of presently being the King of France and that whoever satisfies that property is bald. **The theory of descriptions allows me to report Smith's belief without my referring to any particular individual or even supposing that some individual is denoted by the description. We can even avoid talk of properties here if we wish**, for we might just as well have said that Smith has a belief to the effect that someone or other satisfies the predicate ‘present King of France’ and whoever satisfies that predicate also satisfies the predicate ‘bald’. Notice how much can be accomplished here with minimal technical resources. **By invoking the theory of descriptions we have avoided appeal to nonexistent objects**, and we have likewise avoided saying that Smith's belief is about the concept of the present King of France. If we choose, we can extend our metaphysical austerity further by opting for talk of predicates instead of properties. **The result is that we can freely employ negative existential sentences and we can freely report the beliefs of others**—even if those negative existentials and beliefs are reported by using expressions that fail to denote.

I contend the resolution is incoherent.

First, “living wage” is incoherent since a wage is an inanimate object that cannot live so the object of the government’s obligation is nonsensical, rendering no obligation.

Second, there is no such thing as a just government since A. “just” expresses an ideal but not something that corresponds to reality and B. there are an infinite number of conceptions of justice and no way to reconcile between them proving the resolution’s actor non-existent. If a just government doesn’t exist then they can’t have an obligation because the resolution has no subject capable of being obligated.

Third, saying that employers should be required to pay a living wage implies that they literally cannot exist without a living wage-or that a living wage is inherently essential to employers-but since employers can still be employers without a living wage, the resolution is false since nothing is “required.”

Fourth, proving an obligation of the resolution disproves the resolution since “just” is defined by Merriam Webster as “only” but if a living wage is good, it shouldn’t only be limited only to governments to enforce it-employers and higher ups in corporations ought to require a living wage as well-not *only* governments.

Fifth, “living wage” is a contradiction in terms since by enforcing a living wage you undermine people’s abilities to live the way they want to, namely being able to work for how much they want and offer a job for how much they want-so living wage restrictions are incoherent.

Sixth, a just government is already 100% just by definition so it wouldn’t require a living wage since it already has one and everyone would be just and pay living wages already.

1. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate [↑](#footnote-ref-1)